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INTRODUCTION
The Idaho State Tax Commission's (Commission) reply \\iIl address each of the
arguments PaciliCorp propounds in its response brief.

Before addressing these arguments.

ho\ve\er. the Commission reiterates the relief it seeks.
As PacitiCorp notes, the trial court heard the testimony of the Commission's appraiser.
Mr. Rudd. the Commission's expert appraiser. Mr. Eyre. and PacitiCorp's expert appraiser.
Mr. Tegarden. It found Mr. Tegarden's testimony the more compelling. This is not relevant to
the Commission's appeal. The Commission is not asking the Court to substitute the appraisal of
either Mr. Rudel or Mr. Eyre t()r that of Mr. Tegarden.

Rather. the Commission asks that

PaciliCmp's appraisal should be rejected because its cost approach is deeply l1awed.

If

PacitiCorp's appraisal is rejected, then the Commission respectfully requests the Court uphold
the Commission's decision on the ground PaciliCorp did not bear its burden of proving incorrect
the value establ ished in that decision.

ARGUMENT
PaciliCorp asserts the Commission's claim that obsolescence does ·not exist must be
rejccted in light of the Commission's o'vvn finding of obsolescence. (Respondent's BrieL p. I I.)
Thc Commission docs not claim obsolescence docs not exist.

It argues that PacitiCorp's

appraisal docs not demonstrate that (/(ldilioflUI obsolescence exists; it argues that PaciliCorp's
appraisal greatly overestimates any reasonable amount of additional ubsulescence. cvcn
assuming the cxistence oj' additional obsulescence .

.\PPU ./.i\\,irS REP! .\" BRlFF - I

For tax year 2008, the Commission, sitting as the State Board of Equalization. conducted
a hearing and issued a decision amending Commission staffs appraisal.

It granted an

obsolescence adjustment of 7.93 percent. It is not clear \\hy this adjustment \\as made.' The
Commission presumably heard evidence during the hearing that indicated an obsolescence
adj ustment was appropriate. The decision does not indicate the adj ustment \\as based on income
shorttldl analysis. Mr. Tegarden \vas not a witness at the Commission hearing. and his appraisal
was 110t in evidence.

PacitiCorp's employee, Mr. Ross, developed the income shorttldl data

presented at the heari ng.

He requested an obsolescence adjustment of 26.6 percent.

(Commission decision attached to PacitiCorp's Petition for Judicial Review.) Mr. Ross's ligures
showed a 26.6 percent income shortfall, while Mr. Tegarclen' s income shortlldl calculation
indicates 20.88 percent. This is a

n1(~jor

discrepancy for the same approach valuing the same

company for the same year. It shows how unreliable the income shorttldl approach is \vhen used
as PacitiCorp uses it.

In any event, that the Commission made an adj ustment for less

than 8 percent obsolescence is not an argument for finding more than 20 percent obsolescence.
PacitiCorp next argues that its appraisal and testimony provide substantial evidence that
obsolescence exists. This gets to the crux of the matter. They do not.

PacitiCorp identities

possible causes of obsolescence without demonstrating that these possibilities, in Illet. caused
obsolescence. The amount

or obsolescence associated with each cause is never computed.

That

there is an effect lIn PacitiCorp's hottom line from each asserted calise is Ile\er shmvn.
PaciliCorp identities go\ernmental regulation as the primary cause oj' ohsolescence.

Ih~

tirst ljllestion is, ho\v does it kno\v this'? Mr. Tegarden's appraisal purports simultaneously to
measure both functional and economic obsolescence. (Tegarden. Tcstimony of July 14,2010. p.

I

The \(lting Illeillbers of rile :::!()I)X State Board of Fqllali/iltion are flO lunger with the COl1ll1li"ion. One n.:tirc:d. Olle
and olle \\as appointed to a difkrel1t position in state g()\erllillent.
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110. lines -+-9.) But if it measures obsolescence. it also measures non-obsolescence; for example.
had managcmcnt.

In the absence of specific data, hoyv can PacifiCorp state that gOvernment

regulation causes income

shortl~dl'?

Any income

shortl~dl

somcthing dsc. either legitimate obsolescence or some other

measured could be the result uf
t~lctor

that is not obsolescence at

all.
PaciliCorp's tirst asserted culprit is the regulatory lag time in getting new plant and
equipment into rate base. 2 Respondent notes that according to Mr. Tegarden another of the
primary causes of obsolescence is "the regulatory commission's specific excl usion of certain
properties from rate base. i.e. those properties financed by the funds provided by the deferral
federal income taxes.,·J

or

Respondent also notes that Mr. McDougal identitied additional

regulations that result in obsolescence. All of these things should be directly and independently
quantilied. but in the income

shortl~dl

methodology none of them arc. They arc a mere list of

possibilities. nothing more.
Take. for instance. regulatory lag in getting plant and equipment into rate base. I low
could this be demonstrated in a way that shows obsolescence exists and that it actually adversely
affects PaciliCorp's revenue stream'? At a minimum, PacitiCorp should identify the asset, note
when it was brought on line. then show \vhen the asset was allowed in rate base. It can then olTer
a calculation shO\ving how this affects the bottom line. It docs not do this.
regulatory lag. a

fe\\

With respect to

nther points are \\orth noting. The nevv asset \\ill olten generate income

illlmcdiately. e\en though it is not in rate base. ;\ new generation facility might sell clectricity
"/\ ulilily'S "rate hase' repre\ents the original cost minus depreciation of all property justitiabl:- used by the utility
ill providing services to ilS clistOl1lers. Utilities are allowed to charge custolllers rales \vhich will yield a certain
percentage return on the utility's total investment. Thus. the larger the utility's rate base the higher the rates utilities
can charge to custoll1ers." Cili:::i'11 's Ulili!i"s COlllpLlny v, Idaho Puhlic ['lililii'.I' C{)/Ilmission, \)<) Idaho 164 at 16\),
579P,2d IIOat 115(1978).
\ Iktl:rred incoille taxes will be referred to as DrT. PaciliCorp's position on whether plant and equipment tln~lnced
with [)[T is illcluded in rate base or not is unclear. \Ir. Tegarden's quote is It.HlIld nn page 14 l)fRespondellt's brid~
On page 2X. l'~lciliCorp takes cxception In this samc point \vhell the COl11mission makes it.
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before the

t~lCility

is induded in rate base. When a new customer is served. that customer \vill

start paying for dectricity right a\vay - he does not get free electricity until his connection is
included in rate base. Note, too, that PacifiCorp's appraisal focuses on the adverse impact of
regulatory lag. It ignores the benefits of regulatory lag. Suppose a utility believes the PUC will
lower its permitted return at its next rate hearing. So long as it postpones its rate hearing. it
bene/its from regulatory lag.
What about alleged loss associated with the failure to include deferred income taxes
(DIT) linanced plant and equipment in rate base? Again. this should be directly quantitied. A
utility should at least reveal the dollar value of plant and equipment financed with orr and
calculate how DIT, by itself. contributes to obsolescence.

In

t~lct,

to quantify the alleged

detrimental effect of not allowing the value of orr tinanced plant and equipment in rate base.
PaciJiCorp should quantify the present value of future income loss on plant and equipment
linanced with orr.

PacitiCorp docs not want to do this because the cost of capital for

financed plant and equipment is zero.

orr

There is no future income loss, hence no detrimental

effect. Put bluntly. any rate of return on Orr-financed plant and equipment is gravy. This is
why the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) docs not allow the value of Orr-financed plant and
equipmcnt in rate base. The PUC is not penalizing the company; it simply docs not allow a
\\indf~t11

fur plant and equipment that is financed interest-free.

(Sec, Eyre. Testimony of

Julv 15.2010, p. 292, line 25 through p. 293. lines 1-5.)
Thc same puint can be l11ade in a different way. The PacifiCurp appraisal de\elops
"required rak of return" of 9. I percent in its income approach.

~t

It then incorporates this

"required rate of return" into its cost approach. The f~dlacy underlying PaciJiCorp's view of DIT
begins to be apparent when "requircJ rate

,\PPFLL\NrS RLPLY BRIEI'

,+

or return"

is referred to by the more descriptive

"l11ark~t

\veighkd cost of capital:'

bears

cost. It is

110

th~ sal11~

Drr

as an inkrest

do~s
fr~~

not increase weighted cost of capital because it
loan. There is no required

rat~

of return necessary

to o1'fset the cost of the costless DIT. This is the point of Warren Buffett's comment extolling
the benefits of DIT quoted in the Commission's opening brief

When PaciJiCorp claims

regulatory harm because DIT linanced plant and equipment is not included in rate base, it
assumes such equipment should be in rate base. The claim for obsolescence is based on this
tlmved assumption. The assumption is l1a\ved because the PUC should not allow recowry
costs when there are no costs. Yet, Mr. Tegarden identified the

l~tilure

to put

or

Drr tinanced plant

and equipment in rate base as a chief cause of the obsolescence his methodology purports to
identify.
1'vlr. McDougal lists additional government regulation causing under-earning. These arc:

the usc of historic versus future test periods when setting rates,

inte~jurisdictional

cost allocation

issues that result in less than 100 percent of costs being recovered, the absence of power cost
mechanisms to pass costs on without a rate case being filed, and political Llctors such as those
ElVoring certain 10rms of generation over others. In the absence of probative evidence showing
these

l~lctorS

actually cause obsolescence and in what amount, this is nothing more than a list of

possibilities. There is a further question. "Under-earning" compared to what? Presumably,
Mr. McDougal means PaciliCorp is not earning the maximum return authorized by the various
p[ rcs of tlte statcs in which it sells. nut when did the ceiling become the l1oor? Should nut
p[ 'Cs be setting maximull1 rclurns that are dirticult to reach? If it is easy to reach the maximum
return allowed by law, what incentive is there to become a more erticient producer'? That the
ceiling is ollcnjust out of reach is indicative ofincentivc, not obsolescence.
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PacifiCorp next argues that its use of the income short[dl method is endorsed by various
respected texts and court decisions. It cites The Appraisal Institute, Appraisal of Real Estate
lh

(13 cd. 2008) (Appraisal of Real Estate), and Ring and Boykin's Third Edition of the Valuation

ur Real

Estate (1986) (Ring and Boykin).

Income shortfall is a valid method when properly

used, but it is not properly used in this casco A proper use is illustrated in Appraisal of Real
Estate at page 444. A 4,000 square root retail building is in an over-supplied market. The

O\'Cr-

supply, which is unique to the subject market and expected to last indefinitely, was caused by
overbuilding. Rents, which in a normal market would be $8.00 per square

1'001,

are $6.25 per

sq uare foot. The total income loss is $7,000 [($8.00-$6.25=$1.75) x 4000j. A market derived
capitalization rate is 10 percent. This yields $70,000 in economic obsolescence. ($7,000 -;- .10 =
$7(U)()O.)

This income

shortJ~dl

straightforwardly applied.

methodology is used with a stand-alone structure where it can be

The cause of the obsolescence is specifically identified

over-

building. The amount of income loss associated with the specifically identified cause is directly
computed - $1.75 per square foot by the number of square feet. The diminution in value is
caused only by obsolescence. The cause is unique to the subject's market. Contrast this to the
PaciliCorp appraisal.

Not a stand-alone structure, but a multi-state utility is appraised. The

cause of the obsolescence is asserted to be \'arious l<mns of government regulation. The amount
of obsolescence associatcd with each regulation is not caleulated.
ubsoicscel1ce at all \\ill be relkcted in thl' income slwrtJ'all.
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Factors that arc 110t

Ring and Boykin endorse the income shortfall approach for use in utility valuation. Even
on Ring and Boykin's terms, hO\vever. PacifiCorp's appraisal is \vanting.
identity an income

shortl~lll

method that PacifiCorp does not use.

Ring and Boykin

(Petitioner Exhibit 20,

Tegarden AppraisaL p. 31.) Using Ring and Boykin's method we see that:
Market rate of capitalization (using Mr. Tegarden' s estimate) is 9. I 0 percent
Less allowed rate of return
Yields a loss in earnings of

.83 percent

Performing Ring and Boykin's obsolescence calculation yields 9.) 2 percent obsolescence.
(.83 percent

7

9.10 percent

9.12 percent) Why did Mr. Tegarden choose an income

shortt~dl

calculation that yields 20.88 percent obsolescence when the text he relies upon to justify his
method would calculate 9.12 percent obsolescence using Paci fiCorp's allowed rate of return in
Idaho'? lIe never says. This Elilure alone makes the appraisal suspect. It is just another example
of the lack of precision inherent in Mr. Tegarden's methodology.

This lack of precision is

minimized when specific probative evidence of obsolescence is required. This regulation caused
a cutback in production in this amount at this plant resulting in a loss of this much income.
The same lack of precision is also on display in PacifiCorp's Rcsponse Brief. PacifiCorp
argues that Ring and Boykin provide an authoritative definition of external obsolescencc. This is
thc loss in value "caused by the diftCrence in the rate allowed by regulatory agencies and the ralL'
of retul'll that the in\'l;stment market indicates is competitive to attract a \villing. able. aIllI
inforll1ed purchaser." As sho\\ n. this calculation. using Idaho's allowed rate of return as an
exam pic. yields 9. I 2 percent obsolescence.
something quite different.

In the next paragraph. PacitiCorp argues for

It transforms the Ring and Boykin method (9.10 percent - 8.27

j This is PacitiCorp's actual ratt: ofrdurn in Idaho t,Jr 2008.
It is takt:n li'om the Idaho PUC ratt: case I'AC-L~-()7-0:".
(hkr \lo. 30+X2. p. 4 ("-\'\\_"-\/J21L\:"i.ll~llltJ.R()',!jILtt:rn<;;.1Lgt.s.QS._~11l11rn~trIT..!~Qi0705.il1mD t:fkctivt: January 1.2008.
PaciliCorp. ofcllurst:. opcratt:s in (){ht:r sUlks as \\cll. This t:xalllpk is illustrativt: .
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percent) into 9.10 percent - 7.2 percent. This is accomplished by substituting a projected rate of
return. 7.2 percent. for the allowed rate of return. (Response
obsolescence to Mr. Tegarden's 20.88 percent.

Briet~

pp. 17 & 18.) This increases

Choosing one calculation over another to

maximize obsolescence without even trying to justify the choice is an example of the excessive
subjectivity in rvlr. Tegarden's methodology.
PacifiCorp next argues that Mr. Tegarden's approach has becn accepted by the Indiana
tax court. As to court decisions. precedent is mixed. Mr. Tegarden' s approach to appraising
PaciliCorp has been examined. found wanting, and rejected in Montana for tax years 2005. 2006.
and 2007. 12005 tax year: 2007 WL 2220872 (Mont. Tax App. Bd. pp. 13-15): 2006 and 2007
tax years: 20 II WL 130 I 02 (Mont. Tax Appeal B(\. pp. 25-28.] PacitiCorp appealed the Board's
2005 value to the Montana Supreme Court but did not challenge the rejeetion of Mr. Tegarden's
income

shortf~dl

approach. Pw;(jiCorp v. State oIlviontana, 253 P.3d 847 at 853, 360 Mont. 259

at 268-69 (Mont. S. Ct. 20 11).

The Montana Tax Appeal board decisions are particularly

relevant. These were multi-day hearings with much expert testimony held before a specialist
tribunal examining the same company using the same appraiser. They dissect Mr. Tegarden's
method in detail and find it inadequate for many of the same reasons the Commission now urges.
In addition to Montana's specific rejection of Mr. Tegarden's income shortfall approach.
the approach was more generally rejected in Oregon. In De/ta "iiI' Ulles. Illc. v. Deportment oj'
N(,l'L'IlIIL!.

()X4 P.2d X36. 328 Or. 5% (Or. S. ('1. I (99). the Oregon Supreme Court rejected

Delta's "incol11e-dclicicncy" metlJod that "calculated obsolescence by comparing the rate
return on the assets subject to taxation to the rate of return rcquired to attract investmcnt."

or

(/)('/I({

. iiI' Lines, 984 P.2d at 646.) The Court fOLlnd it significant that using the income-dcliciency

mcthod. thc cost indicator of valuc equals the income indicator. This can strip the cost approach

.\]>1>11 L!\:\T"S REPLY BRIEF - R

uf its usefulness as an inckpl.'ndent indicator of value. The Court said it \\as unable to conclude
from the e\idencl.' before it what type of obsolescence adjustment. if any. was warranted.
PaciliCorp's appraisal also calculates obsolescence by comparing the estimated actual rak of
rclurn to the rate of return it claims is required by the market. The e\idl.'nce for obsolescence is
the same hcre as it \Vas in De/la /Jir Lines. that is to say. non-specific.

De//([ A ir Lines is interesting for another reason. The Court sought guidance fi'om the
Wl.'skrn States Association of Tax Administrators (WSATA) Handbook. Whilc ultimately not
helpful in the airline case, the Court did note the handbook's statement concerning deducting for
obsolescence when using the historical cost less depreciation (lICLD) cost indicator.

The

I landbook states:
IICLD cost indicators are generally not adjusted further to account for
appreciation or depreciation. A deduction from HCLD for obsolescence is just as
inconsistent as adding value to HCLD because some of the utility's property has
increased in value since it was acquired, or because the utility's earnings arc
extraordinarily high for some reason (e.g. lax regulatory oversight). The practice
of not adjusting lICLD for perceived obsolescence cloes not mean that
obsolescence has not been considered and measured, since as noted previollsly,
regulatory depreciation should. in theory, reflect all forms of obsolescence.
WSATA I Iandbook at II-12.
In this case. of course. the Commission applied regulatory depreciation in arriving at its value.
/\t trial. PaciliCorp attempted to discredit the WSATA IIandbook.

Ring and Boykin.

hO\\c\er. cite WSATA on page -+ 19 of their text. Ring and Boykin may disagree with the above
quote. but they bclic\c WS,\TA ,1lIthl)J"itati\c enough

to

quote.

COllcl'rning the WSXIA

I Iandbook. thc Commission's expert appraiser, Mr. Eyre tcstified. "I think it is the most
autitoritativc treatise on this subject out therc ..... ' (Lrye. Testimony of July 15.2010, p. 290.
Ii Ile I.)

/\PPI:LL/\NrS I{!:PLY BRIIT
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PacitiCorp next maintains that the depreciation it reports to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) does not account for all depreciation. PacitiCorp argues that
\\hen the Commission notes that PacitiCorp's self-reported depreciation is already supposed to
include ohsolescence. the Commission is contradicted by its own witness.

It is not.

The

Commission's witness, Dr. Johnson, was asked if book depreciation "on the FERC" includes all
forms of economic obsolescence. Dr. Johnson responded that the intent of the regulatory process
is to pick up all forms of ohsolescence and that there is no intent to exclude economic
obsolescence. but that he could not say it "precisely picks up every form or obsolescence." The
Commission's point is still valid. The depreciation PacifiCorp reports to FERC is supposed to
include obsolescence. Dr. Johnson testified he cannot say the FERC report captures absolutely

el'erything. This is small support for diminishing the value of a company by almost 21 percent
more than depreciation already claimed.
PaciliCorp also argues that the depreciation it reports to FERC is not "self.-reported"
because the depreciation figure is determined by various state PUCs. But PaciJiCorp's input into
the depreciation figures is crucial.

As PacifiCorp notes, Mr. McDougal testified that the

company submits a proposed depreciation study to various state PUCs every live years. This is
then reviewed, and the PUCs determine the depreciation rate that will be used. When PaciliCorp
reports annual depreciation to FERC, the starting point for the ligure is its own submissions to
state P! JCs. Furthermore, as Mr. l\1cDougal states. there arc diflCrent depreciation rates set hy
dil'!'erl'llt Pl'Cs. (\IcDougal. testimony of July 16,2010. p. 134, lines I

17.) PacillCorp cannot

be simply echoing a PUC depreciation rate \vhen there arc different PlJC rates.
depreciation PaciliCorp reports to FERC is supposed to be reliahle.

<
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I·'inally. the

That is the point of the

report. If PacifiCorp reports ligures it thinks are unreliable. it should at least note the fact. The
FERC filing has no such caveat.
PacifiCorp's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tiling contains no such caveat
A revie\v of the SEC tiling discloses depreciation of $6.125 billion as of

either.

December 31.2007. (petitioner Exhibit 2, SEC Form 10-K. p. 65.) This depreciatiun figure is in
line with M r. Tegarden' s depreciation number bet()re he subtracts additional

0

bso lescence:

approximately $6.692 billion. (Petitioner Exhibit 20. Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.)

It is also

similar to Mr. Rudd's and Mr. Eyre's depreciation figures. PacifiCorp's 10-K docs not mention
the additional depreciation of $2.325 billion due to obsolescence that PacitiCorp wants /()r
property tax purposes.
PacifiCorp next argues that Mr. Tegarden and Mr. McDougal never said PacifiCorp
would always operate in the red. This argument has merit. The Commission accepts that vvhat
Mr. Tegarden and Mr. McDougal were really saying is that for every dollar PacifiCorp invests. it
receives less than a dollar of benefit. The witnesses were speaking of opportunity cost. not
actual red ink. This, however, c10es not alter the Commission's point.

Why would anyone,

especially Berkshire Hathaway, ever invest in PacitiCorp if there is an eternal opportunity cost in
making the investment? And. if you did buy it, why vvould you hold on to it? After alL if you
receive less than a dollar of benefit f()r e\'ery dollar

YOLI

invest, the company will never again be

worth as l11uch as it is right now. Yet Paci/iCorp has a ten-year plan! Respondent Exhibit 516.
(scaled)!

~lI1d

even !\1r. Tegarden assumes Berkshire IIathaway intends to hold the company f()r

the long term. (Petitioner Exhibit 20. Tegarden Appraisal, p. 94 referring to a "patient and longterm \'ie"v.") The fact that PaciliCorp was purchased in the first place, together with the

f~lct

that

thc investment appears to be long-term. both argue against the central theme of Mr. Tegarden's
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appraisal, that PacifiCnrp willncvcr earn thc revenue it should. Further. the Commission's point
concerning the len year plan is \alid. It docs not say PacitiCorp will ncver earn the revenue it
should. But, if true, \vould not such a point figure prominently in a 137 page ten-year plan'?~
The Commission argues that the income shortt~lll method does not take into account the
additional benefit to the company provickd by

orr. It

noted that the Commission's expert.

Dr. Johnson estimated that taking this benefit into account \Yould reduce Mr. Tegarden's cost of
capital of 9.) () percent to about 7 percent.

PacifiCorp responds that this contradicts the

Commission's own cost of capital calculations. It docs not. Neither the Commission's appraiser
nor its expert vvitness subtracted additional obsolescencc bascd on the argument that PUCs do
not allow DIT financed plant and equipment into rate base. Dr. Johnson's point is that if you
attempt to make this additional deduction for the alleged 'DIT harm' (DIT tinanced plant and
equipment not in rate base), then you must offset it with adding in the 'DIT benefit' (DIT
providcd cost-free capital).

No Drr adjustment is required of the Commission's appnllSers

because they do not attempt to deduct additional depreciation for 'OIT harm.'
PacitiCorp next takes issue with the Commission's contention that the income shortf~dl
methodology attributes zero value to plant and equipment not in rate base, that is, the plant and
equipment financed with DIT. The Response Brief argues that PUCs put all property in rate base
and diminishes the rate of return allowed on all property to reflect DIT.

First, this is not

!'vIr. Tegardel1's characterization. \11'. Tegarden speaks of .. the regulatory commission's specific
exclusion of certain properties from the rate hase, i.e. those properties financed by funds
prmided by the defl:rral of federal income taxes." (Tegarden, Testimony oUuly 14, .20 I 0, p. 34,
lines 10-14.) Second, PacitiCorp raises a distinction without a difference. Whether a PUC docs
, The COl1lmission searched for the word "obsolescence" in the ten-y.:ar plan and found it only OIlC':. It is Ill.:ntion.:d
in a way that Illak.:s c lear it r.:fers to fUllctional. not econolll ic. ohsol.:sc.:nce. I Responci.:nt·s Exh ibit :) 1(1. Paci tiCorp
20()1{ 2017 T':Il-Year Plan (s.:aled). p. 132.] l'acitiCorp's apprabal claims ecolh)lnic. not functional. ubsuicscence.
\PPI~LL.\NrS

RFYLY BRIEF - 12

not allow DIT tinanced plant and equipment into rate base or allows it into rate base and then
diminishes the allowed rate of return to adjust for DIT, the mathematical results are the same.
Regardkss of\\hieh formulation we use, PaeitiCorp's argument is: (1) only property that earns
money has value, (:2) property not included in rate base does not earn money. therefore (3)
property not included in rate base has zero value and a reduction for obsokscence properly
relkcts this. The Commission agrees with the Oregon Supreme Court: property acquired using
DIT has intrinsic value and must be taxed. Pacific POlrer & Ughl v. Deportment oj" Rel'elllle.
,,,'tale

oj"Oregon. 775 P.2d 303 (at 3(8).308 Or 49 (at 57-58.)

PaciliCorp next argues that the Commission's reliance on the sale price of PacitiCorp
in 2006 to undermine Mr. Tegarden's appraisal is problematic because the evidence before the
district court was that the sale price included non-taxable and exempt assets, tc)r example.
goodwill. There arc a number of points to make. First, this misses the Commission's point.
Mr. Tegarden did not even consider the sale because he said it was not a market sale. The
Commission pointed out that under Idaho Code it was indeed a market sale. Mr. Tegarden had
no business ignoring it. Second, PacifiCorp ignores how non-taxable property is subtracted from
value. Determine unit value, then subtract out exempt property. The sale is useful as a reality
check for determining unit value, 'vvhieh is, after aiL the point of this case. Third, PaciliCorp
argues that more than 10 percent of the sales price was attributable to goodwill and goodwill is
not taxable. nut this last point undercuts PaciliCorp'sjustitication for obsolescence. namely that
PaciliCorp \vill al\\ays earn below its "required rate of return." "Gomh,ill." by delinition. is the
"abilitv of a business to

generate

(IDAPA 35.01.03.615.01.f.)

PaciliCorp cannot argue both that it reqUIres an obsolescence

income

1/1

excess of a normal

rate

.

adj lIstment because it under-carns and that part of the sales price should be deducted because it
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n:lleeted good\\"ill resulting from over-earning. If Mr. Tegarden had only tried to address the
market sale of PacitiCorp in 2006, he might have discussed these things.

But he did not.

Arriving at a value for PacifiCorp and not even considering the sale that took place less than two
years before is a major flaw in the appraisal. At a minimum, the sale is a valuable reality check.
It is one PacifiCorp's appraisal

t~lils.

The 2006 sales price \vas over $9 billion. Bet\veen 2006

and 20()8, approximately $2 billion was added to the company. Yct PacifiCorp's cost approach
values the company at about $8.81 billion. Including the income

l~lctor,

PacifiCorp asserts its

overall value is $8.35 billion. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal. p. 27.)
The Commission argued that one of the reasons the PacitiCorp appraisal is unreliable is
because it surreptitiously and dramatically changes the weighting of the incomc approach and thc
cost approach. PacitiCorp objects to the word "surreptitious." The Commission stands by it.
Each of thc other appraisals forthrightly states thc weight it attachcs to the difTcrent indicators of
value used whcn arriving at a tinal value. Only PacifiCorp's appraisal does not. This is a defect.
If one value indicator gives a high estimate of value and another indicator gives a lower one, then
the linal value can be dramatically changed by giving more weight to one and less to the other.
This is thc rcason the weighting ought to be specifically noted. Mr. Rudd and Mr. Tegardcn each
used two indicators of value. cost and income.

Mr. Rudd weightcd them 45 percent

and 55 percent, respectively. PaciliCorp's unstated wcights arc approximately 19 perccnt and 81
p. . . rc . . . nt. Because the income indicator is the less . . . r value. this \veighting lowers the
This could have been forthrightly stated. It was not.

lin~d

valu ......

\Vhen he was kstifying. [,vir. Tegarden

admitted he did not assign weights to the various indicators. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 1..1..
20 I O. p. 85, line 25.) PacifiCorp notes that Mr. Eyre assigned only 20 percent weight to the cost
indicator. but f'vlr. Eyre lIsed three approaches to valuc. not t\\o .

•\PPLLL\Nf'S REPLY BRIEF
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PacifiCorp next argues that the income shortt~tll method does not reduce the cost
approach to the income approach. This is true when the income shorthlll method is properly
used. ,\n example of its proper use is

j~)Und

in Appraisal oj'Real Estate, discussed earlier, in

\vhich a stand-alone stllcture's obsolescence-caused income shortl~lll \\as precisely measured.
The measurement did not rely on considerations of weighted cost of capital and rate of return
developed in the income approach. PaciJiCorp' s income shortbll method is not properly used.
It j~lctors earnings into its cost approach by relying on both the capitalization rate (weighted cost
of capital: required rate of return) and the rate of return developed in its income approach. It
then uses these ligures to adjust the cost approach to approximate the income approach. When it
does this, it effectively turns the cost approach into the income approach.

As the Oregon

Supreme Court disapprovingly noted, it "e1iminates a relevant perspective from consideration."

United Te/I.'plwne

('0.

v. Department oj'Rl.'vel1l1e, 770 P.2d43 at 51. (S.Ct. Or. 1989.)

The next point comes about when the Commission points out that the income shortt~lll
approach measures short1~tll caused by J~lctors other than obsolescence.
possibilities, including bad management.

It provides a list of

PacifiCorp argues that the Commission "j~lils to

marshal any evidence to support its criticism of PacifCorp's appraisal on this particular basis."
(Response BrieL p. 36.)

This is merely an attempt to shin the burden of proof to the

COlllmission. When PacifiCorp uses a methodology that measures both ohsolescence and nonllhsolescence, it is up to PacifiCorp to demonstrate that its method does not include an)thing but
llbsolescence.

It never did this.

In j~lcL lIsing PacifiCorp's income shortl~t11 methodology, it

cannot separate the effects of obsolescence from faetors that are not obsolescence.

,\PPLLL:\:\rs REPLY BRIEl'
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Responding to the Commission's argument that Mr. Tegarden's approach is far too
subjectin~,

PacifiCorp notes that all appraisal has an clement of subjectivity. This misses the

point. Appraisals that minimize subjectivity are better than appraisals that do not. PacifiCorp's
use of the income shortfall approach is excessively subjective. Examples of this were previously
noted.

For tax year 2008, Mr. Ross, representing PacitiCorp before the Commission, claimed

obsolescence in excess of 26 percent. Mr. Tegarden found less than 21 percent for the same
year. As noted in the opening briet: however, for tax year 2005, Mr. Tegarden found PacitiCorp
had more than 30 percent obsolescence. The diffcrenee in these figures results in huge swings in
value. Another example of subjectivity lies in the selection of the calculation to determine the
percentage of obsolescence.

Taking Idaho's allowed rate of return as an example, Ring and

Boykin's formula results in less than one half the obsolescence Mr. Tegarden caleulates. A third
example of subjectivity lies in the figure selected for weighted cost of capital. Three appraisers
selected three different figures, Mr. Tegarden's being the highest.

or course,

one of the

subjective elements is the use of a method that measures income shortfall resulting from

lm~jor
f~lctors

that are not obsolescence and assume it is obsolescence.
How can this subjectivity be minimized? Suppose PaciliCorp has a

co~tl-fired

plant that

is subject to new, more stringent, clean air requirements. Rather than make the large investment
needed to improve the plant. the company decides to shut it down. The value of the closed plant
remaining after depreciation may well result in economic obsulescenee.
llbsolescence based on a specific claim can be calculated.

The point is,

:\ specific regulatory action is

identificd, its effect on specific plant and equipment is shown, the effect is lJuantified. Factors
unrelated to obsolescence arc eliminated.
obsolescence. Add them lip.

0!O\\
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Do this for each item claimed to contribute to

subjectivity is minimized .

CONCLUSION
The income shortfall methodology used in PacifiCorp's appraisal is seductive.

The

Commission should knmv. It partially fell for it in 2006. 6 It can be made to sound reasonable. It
llses numbers, and numbers cannot err, can they? Well, yes they can. If the assumptions and
methodological navvs underlying the numbers are t~nIity, the numbers are not reliable.

The

Commission identifies a number of nssumptions and tlaws. It urges that these can be minimized
by adopting the position that claims for obsolescence be proven with evidence of the specific
cause of the obsolescence, the quantity of the obsolescence. and that the asserted obsolcscence
actually affects the value of the property. It respectfully asks the Court to so hold. It further asks
the Court

(0

hold that, as PacifiCorp did not provide such proof: it did not mecl its burden of

proof and that the Commission decision it appealed be upheld.
DATED this I ill day of November 2011.

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

" PaciliCorp claimed 31.S percent and got 13 percent. PacifiCorp argues that because the incomc ,11UrIl:illmethod
\1 a~
in ~(){J(). it should cUlltinuc tll bc recogni/ed. Ihat a mistake \\<1S madc in thc past is nut an
arl!lIl11cnt fix continuing to makc thc mistake in the future.
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